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Abstract 
As political scientists start applying the complex-system approach to study party politics and 
as business scholars start to apply communication theories to study deinstitutionalization, we 
propose to study and explain politics within a political party. This study employs a 
systematically collected field observation data to evaluate Clemente and Roulet’s (2015) “the 
spiral of deinstitutionalization” framework. Applying this framework to the study of an 
established and institutionalized party as the KMT, we are able to expose how party actors and 
agency can be key factors in understanding the process of both institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization. Based on analysis of news events and internal reports within Kuomintang 
(KMT) from April 20 to October 17, 2015, we assess how well Clemente and Roulet’s 
framework explain the drama relating to the reneging of official nomination of Hung Hsiu-Chu 
(KMT’s first ever presidential candidate) barely three months before voters cast their votes in the 
presidential election on January 16, 2015. We construct and assemble the whole story and 
provide details that contribute to enriching the framework for future organizational and political 
party research.   
                                                            
1 Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop on Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Political 
Organizations, 2016 European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Pisa, Italy, 24-28 April 2016. 
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Introduction 
As political scientists start applying the complex-system approach to study party politics 
(Laver & Sergenti, 2012) and as business scholars start to apply communication theories to study 
deinstitutionalization (Clemente & Roulet, 2015), we adopt this prospect to study and explain the 
dynamics of politics within a political party. This study collects data from field observation with 
we examine Clemente and Roulet’s (2015) “the spiral of deinstitutionalization” framework.  
The case we selected for this study is the controversy about Kuomintang or the Chinese 
nationalist party (KMT) dealt with its candidate nominee Hung Hsiu-Chu (洪秀柱), the deputy 
chair of Legislative Yuan, about six months before the 2016 presidential election. This case is 
salient and important for this study of deinstitutionalization because KMT, which has been in 
power for the past eight years, has been challenged since 2013 for its ideology of maintaining 
positive relationship with Mainland China in terms both economy and politics. How it fell into 
chaos and deinstitutionalized in 2015 demand theoretical explanation and better understanding.  
As well documented in the literature (Chang & Holt, 2014; Gries & Su, 2013; Hao, 1996; 
Lin, 2008; Wu, 2011), KMT’s “friendly to China” ideology was once recognized the key factor 
of the second rotation of ruling party in 2008 after Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s ruling 
from 2000 to 2008. Voters seemed to mandate KMT for keeping interaction with Mainland 
China and KMT managed to meet this expectation. However, as Taiwanese consciousness and 
ethnic identification rises, progressive actions of paving way to Mainland China starts to lose its 
legitimacy.  Negative atmosphere merged the time when cross-Strait talks about the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a political arrangement that aims to liberalize trade 
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in services between the two economies, was initiated 2010. As the sentiment accumulated and 
KMT continued to walk down the path of talks, KMT was forced to face the incongruence 
between its and the majority of voters’ will. 
On March 18, 2014, a group of young scholars and students broke into the Legislative Yuan, 
using it as a radical means to call for the public’s attention to the Ma administration’s attempt to 
ratify the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a treaty that was extended from 
ECFA and signed in June 2013. This so-called Sunflower Movement of “occupying the 
[Taiwanese] Congress” was the result of a continuous social movement against the ratification of 
CSSTA. This movement, in which 500,000 citizens participated, successfully called for an 
island-wide attention to the controversial trade talks with Mainland China and it lead to KMT’s 
defeat in the 7-in-1 local election in the end of 2014. Interpreted as a strong signal or resentment 
to the Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) administration, Ma resigned from the KMT chairman on 
December 4, 2014. Eric Chu (朱立倫), the major of New Taipei City and one of few KMT 
candidates that kept the office, was elected with high approval rate as the new chairman of KMT 
on January 17, 2015.   
In the face of 2016 Presidential and Congressional elections, KMT fell into deep chaos in the 
spring of 2015, struggling to nominate a proper presidential candidate to compete DPP’s 
chairman Tsai Ing-wen and her group of legislator candidates. KMT had been silent about the 
whole month between Tsai’s expression of running for the office on March 11 and DPP’s formal 
nomination on April 13, 2015. 
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From March to June, KMT supporters suffered from the embarrassing situation where they 
found no one that lead the campaign. As no one expressed willingness to lead the election and 
compete, including chairman Chu, Hung became the only choice that passed KMT’s whole 
nomination process on July 15. The problem is, suddenly KMT elites and supporters have to face 
the reality that Hung is the only one to lead the party.  As poll results continued to show that 
Hung by no means to win the election (Hung seldom goes higher than 30% and Tsai no lower 
than 40%), rumors within the party and across the news media emerged and continued to cast 
doubt about KMT’s attempt to recruiting Chu to replace Hung. From July to October, Chu and 
Hung keep rejecting the rumors in public, but on October 14 Chu sent his apology to Hung and 
KMT’s Central Standing Committee passed the proposal of rescinding Hung’s candidacy, 
leaving the society astonished. On 17, in the extempore congress a majority of the 891 KMT 
representatives at the congress approved Eric Chu’s nomination and formally rescinded Hung’s 
candidacy. 
Could this seldom seen and dramatic change in the presidential candidate nomination 
occurred within Taiwan’s largest political party is simply attributed to the calculation of wining 
the election?  How could it happen given that Hung had passed all required legal nomination 
process set by KMT itself? Could the polls showing the slim chance that Hung would win decide 
the decision shift?2  If so, how could that happen?  
As a special case in Taiwan party politics, KMT’s internal chaos from April to October 
requires a theoretical understanding. Employing the perspective of deinstitutionalization 
                                                            
2  http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/17/asia/taiwan-kmt-president-candidate-swap/ 
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(Clemente & Roulet, 2015), we evaluate the extent to which this “spiral of deinstitutionalization” 
theoretical framework explains the case. Based on field observations from inside the KMT from 
April 15 to October 17, 2015, we point out that the theoretical framework correctly explains how 
“field opinion” within the party conflicts with “public opinion” revealed by news polls and how 
this dynamics lead to deinstitutionalization of KMT. We further add our observations and 
suggestion about how to advance the framework. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Deinstitutionalization is a process by which practices are abandoned because they have lost 
their social approval (Oliver, 1992). A deinstitutionalization process relies on discursive 
struggles between actors who push to abandon a practice and those who try to maintain it and 
public opinion empowers actors of one side to oppose the other side (Clemente & Roulet, 2015). 
“In fields that exert a strong silencing pressure on their members, insiders are less likely to align 
with public opinion’s hostility initially, but once a majority of field members agree with public 
opinion, field opinion exerts a greater pressure on other members to comply and abandon a 
practice.” (p.36) 
Clemente and Roulet’s (Clemente & Roulet, 2015) theoretical framework of “spiral of 
deinstitutionalization” borrows the analogy of Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) theory of spiral of 
silence and applied it to explain how some actors in one group are more dominant in a decision 
making process. In the original “spiral of silence” theory, voters of one side of an issue hesitate 
to express their preferences when they perceive via public opinion polls that they are in the 
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minority. As other voters of the same side also perceive that they are in minority, this side can 
become even more silent. When this theory is applied to decision making within an institution or 
a group, the analogy “spiral of deinstitutionalization” suggests that public opinion outside the 
institution becomes a mean rather than simply a reference for key actors to achieve their goal, 
such as engaging in a practice or not, or abandoning a decision or not.  
Outside the institution the news media are “crucial vehicle for assessing the climate of 
opinion at the public level” (p.15). Inside the institution or the “field,” the field media play a 
crucial role of targeting at field members and “exerting a strong pressure for conformity” (p.18). 
The dynamic of deinstitutionalization occurs when interpersonal communication effects (e.g., 
voicing out one’s preferences) join media influence. Scenario one: “it may be easier to reach a 
tipping point when field opinion swings toward opposing a practice, but once this happens, the 
spiral of silence exerts less pressure on other insiders to abandon the practice” (p.22). One 
reason, according to the original theory of spiral of silence, is that the minority at the field level 
fear to be in the minority. Scenario two: institutions where the silencing pressure is weak are 
“more permeable to public opinion and are more receptive to influences from other institutional 
arenas” (p. 22). It is expected that such fields are more likely to win insiders in the first place and 
then find it difficult to make all actors converge.  
Besides the fear of being in the minority, there are four factors that influence conformity. 
First, normative motives lead actors to avoid disapproval within their groups. Second, strategic 
motives lead actors to rely on outsiders to create values. Third, cognitive motives lead actors to 
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avoid ambiguity and uncertainty. (p.26). The fourth is identification. “Actors’ identification with 
a field could moderate their few of being in the minority” (p.34).  
Figure 1 is a representation of Clemente and Roulet’s (Clemente & Roulet, 2015) Figure 3. It 
gives a clear guidance about how to predict the behavior of the actors in the field. In the initial 
situation when public opinion opposes a practice, “the field defends it, and insiders have to 
decide whether or not to defend the practice. If they do, they will face a spiral of silence at the 
public level and if they oppose it, they will face a spiral of silence at the field level where they 
are in the minority. Spirals of silence at the public and field levels are in opposition, pulling 
insiders in different directions. This tension remains until the field opinion changes and becomes 
aligned with public hostility or vice versa” (p.20). If field actors decide to comply with the field 
opinion and oppose the public opinion’s sentiment of a practice, the influence of public opinion 
on field opinion slows down and results in “upward” spiral of silence. If field actors comply with 
the majority of the public opinion, they will tend to silence other field members; and if they 
become the majority at the field level, the spiral of silence in the field will become aligned with 
the one in the public sphere.  
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Figure 1: Schematic summary of the impact of public opinion on deinstitutionalization 
 






We don’t mean to just apply this theoretical framework to our observation of the KMT case 
but hope to compare our observation with the theoretical framework. We set our observation 
period from April 20, the first day of the nomination process, to October 17, 2015, when Hung’s 
candidacy was rescinded. We keep a journal of the news and KMT’s internal reports and update 
them daily. Such data plus first-hand observation provided by one author of this study draw a 
quite clear picture, although it may not be comprehensive enough, for us to evaluate the theory of 
spiral of deinstitutionalization.  
 
Findings and Discussion 
The findings are presented in three parts. The first is a summary of the observation journal 
and provides more details about the case, particularly the two sides of the controversy. The 
second presents the parts of observation that match the predictions drawn from the theoretical 
framework. The third part focus on additional insights that go beyond the theoretical framework.  
 
1. Summary of the Observation 
The whole story can be arranged into three stages according to the important dates. The first 
stage is from Hung’s claiming to run for nomination on April 20 to the internal polls, used to 
confirm her popularity, held on June 12-13. The second stage is from the release of the poll 
results to the KMT’s national party congress on July 19, where the party formally nominated 
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Hung. The third stage is from the party congress meeting to the extempore congress meeting on 
October 17, where Hung was rescinded as the party’s president candidate.  
As the Deputy Legislative Speaker, Hung Hsiu-chu earned rich experienced in her legislator 
career since 1989 and won eight consecutive terms as KMT’s legislator. She has been named 
several times in different organizations as top legislator for her overall excellent professional 
performance. However, to the general public she has not been seen as a nationally known figure 
inside and outside the KMT. So her active participation in the presidential candidate nomination 
process on April 20 in the face of absence of candidate was unfavored but appreciated by 
primary actors of KMT. In this first stage, although no-one in KMT claimed to run the election, 
key actors such as the Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-Ping (王金平) and Vice President Wu 
Den-yih (吳敦義) were possible figures to be called by the party as the presidential candidate if 
Hung did not pass the nomination criteria.  Therefore, by the time Hung passed the “popularity 
check” by KMT with three poll figures (in average of 46% support nation wide) on June 13, 
three groups had formed within the party: one favoring that Wang to be called, one for Wu, and 
one favoring chairman Chu. None of the group was satisfied with the result that the party had to 
nominate Hung as the presidential candidate. Therefore, the rumor about “changing Hung” 
started to circulate in the news media right after the nomination process was completed. Note 
that the rumor had never ceased since the Hung’s nomination, leaving Chu, KMT, and Hung 
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continued to claimed publicly to the news media that the nomination was fully legitimate, 
endorsed and won’t be changed for anyone.3 The rumor even more unscaled later in October.4  
The second stage is from the release of the poll results in June to the KMT’s national party 
congress, where the party formally nominated Hung, on July 19. Within this month, Hung 
seemed confident and started to talk publicly about her public policy stances, while the actors 
within the party was watching closely about her talks and continued to evaluate her. Two that 
shocked both the party and the public were that she interpreted that cross-Strait relation as “One 
China, Same Interpretation,” which is inconsistent with KMT’s “92 consensus” policy that 
emphasizes “One China, Separate Interpretation”. And the second is that she said she could not 
recognized Republic of China (ROC).5 Her campaign talks like such seriously influenced her 
popularity within KMT,6 so right before the party congress she and her campaign office has 
been warned and regulated to avoid acting alone.7  
Hung and her campaign office were expected to follow KMT’s campaign strategy, but the 
acting alone style of Hung and her campaign office director Joe Chen-Chung (喬正中) enraged 
the core decision makers, including, Director of Organizational Development Committee Su Jun-
pin (蘇俊賓), Director of Administration Committee Lin Yu-hsien (林祐賢), and most 
importantly Secretary-General Lee Shu-chuan (李四川). They influenced the chairman Eric 
Chu’s decision and actions about “changing Hung”.  
                                                            
3  http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/10/07/2003629453 
4  http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/taiwans-kmt-moves-to-replace-its-presidential-candidate/ 
5  http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/07/04/2003622215 
6  http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/kmt-s-hung-faces/1992774.html 
7  http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/07/19/441074/Hung-wont.htm 
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The third stage is from the party congress meeting to the extempore congress meeting on 
October 17, where Hung was rescinded as the party’s president candidate. The relationship 
between Hung and KMT decision makers was worsened along with the frequent public polls 
showing slim opportunity that Hung would win the election. This is the most critical stage to 
evaluate the theory of spiral of deinstitutionalization, as in the field (KMT) both groups rely their 
actions on field opinion and public opinion, while the practice is “changing Hung”. 
 
2. The Match of Observation and Theoretical Expectation 
Public and field opinions are critical means by which KMT decision makers justified their 
actions to “change Hung”. In the first stage (April 20 to June 13), supporting for Hung was the 
majority inside the party. To KMT supporters the public polls of average 46.6% well justified 
that Hung can be the right candidate to compete with DPP’s chairman Tsai Ying-wen.8  
As the theory predicts, the tipping point (converting the opposite voice to cooperate with the 
majority) was quickly reached when the field opinion was inconsistent with the greater pressure 
from public opinion. This is the stage where key actors and groups were not allied. The director 
of Organizational Development Committee the Secretary-General Lee Shu-chuan put aside their 
                                                            
8  While there has been systematical explanation for this figure, ours is that (1) the poll question wording, 
(2) DPP supporters’ calculation, and (3) KMT supporters’ sentiment about the absence of candidate lead to this 
result. First, the questions of the internal poll conducted in June include “Do you support Hung Hsiu-Chu or not” (請
問你支持或不支持洪秀柱？) and “Comparing DPP’s Tsai Ying-wen and KMT’s Hung Hsiu-Chu, which one will 
you support as the president?” (在民進黨的蔡英文和國民黨的洪秀柱中，請問您會支持哪一位來做總統？) 
KMT supporters were given no options but choosing “support” and “Hung”. Second, DPP supporters knew well that 
KMT chairman Eric Chu is more competitive than Hung to compete against Tsai. It is hence likely that they 
strategically chose Hung in telephone surveys, aiming at blocking Chu. Third, right before the polls KMT supporters 
have been worried and anxious about the absence of a presidential candidate. It is likely that they expressed their 
support of whomever is on the list. 
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proposal of urging chairman Chu to run for the election. But the Director of Organizational 
Development Committee Su Jun-pin and Director of Administration Committee Lin Yu-hsien 
had showed their unwillingness to cooperate with Hung. 
The second stage (June 13 to July 19) is when these key actors of KMT decided to allied and 
oppose the practice of officially nominating Hung as the presidential candidate.  Hung’s public 
talks about “One China, two interpretations” and “I cannot recognize the existence of ROC” 
triggered such actions. Pressures and complains from within KMT, such as senior officers and 
local leaders such as Liao Liouyi (廖了以), Chang Jung-wei (張榮味), Cheng Ru-Fen (鄭汝芬), 
even the President Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九), and from outside KMT started to put pressure to 
KMT decision makers to consider NOT to formally nominate Hung on July 19. KMT entered the 
phenomenon of deinstitutionalization. Given that Wang Jin-Pyng remained silent about the 
nomination and no other candidates available, Chairman Chu still followed the legal procedure to 
complete the nomination. 
To us, the first two stages make KMT a near-perfect case to evaluate the spiral of 
deinstitutionalization theory. Decision makers were divided into two groups, including those 
who liked to keep staying on the path (united and supporting Hung) and those who prefer 
changing the path (rescinding Hung and call someone better as the presidential candidate). The 
former alliance was the majority in the first stage but not in the second stage as the anti-Hung 
alliance empowered themselves with both field and public opinions.9 
                                                            
9  For example, internal poll showed that Hung’s support has dropped from 46% to 33.8% in early July ( 
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What happened in the three months of the third stage (July 19 to October 17) was predicted 
quite well by the theory. This is a pattern consistent with the downward spiral of silence in 
Figure 1. On August 6 the chairman of People-First Party (PFP) James Soong (宋楚瑜) declared 
that he would run in the presidential election. Since then, Hung suffered even more lower poll 
figures.10 Hung and her alliance, including KMT’s Institute of National Research and 
Development and KMT’s think tank National Policy Foundation (NPF), formulated a series of 
policy proposals as defense against Soong. Some KMT legislators cooperated and endorsed the 
policies but the KMT administrative organizations were slow in action. For example, KMT 
supposed to run the campaign in July but Hung’s office did not receive the party’s staff name list 
and money to run a serious of national actives by the end of September. Youth branch and local 
branch attributed their delayed actions to the reelection of the Standing Committee of the 
Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The cultural and communication branch joined 
Hung’s alliance but did not go along well with Hung in terms of who taking the lead and the if 
quality of materials are acceptable to print. 
These incompatible problems are both a cause and a consequence of the opposition alliance’s 
actions. Hung did feel the frustration and asked around on September 26 if it is ok that she 
resigned. This is about the time the opposition alley became the majority, and the alliance gained 
the support of Secretary-General Lee Shu-Chuan and chairman Eric Chu. These days the two 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150707000427-260102) while public polls in general showed 
that Hung’s support is no higher than 30%. 
10  Internal poll showed that Hung’s support continued to drop to lower than 20% 
(http://www.ettoday.net/news/20150819/552385.htm and  
 http://news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/news-619853/) , while public polls show a similar pattern (15% and 21%). 
15 
groups contacted for few times. Lee represented the opposition alliance to pass the message if 
Hung resigned Chu would take over. Chu joined Lee in the second talk with Hung the next day 
but Hung, based on her judgment that KMT will collapse if she resigned, and refused to resign. 
This can be seen as the last time that the majority alliance held out the olive branch before the 
national day on October 10.  
As we observed from the whole process and interactions between the key actors, we saw that 
Hung and her office continued to believe in the legal procedure to justify her candidacy and 
ignore the expansion of the opposition alliance that kept drawing legitimacy of its actions from 
both field and public opinion. The voice and reaction from Hung’s side became weaker. On 
October 7, standing committee member Jiang Shuo-Ping (江碩平) sent out the issue to hold an 
extempore congress to solve this Hung case. The opposition alliance hence landed “united” to 
isolate Hung and her office. The practice of “changing Hung” was realized in the national 
extempore congress meeting held on October 17. Hung was rescinded as the party’s president 
candidate and chairman Chu completed the legal process of replacing Hung to run the election 
with the approval of 812 out of 891 national representatives who attended the congress that 
day.11 In effect, 993 representatives showed up that day but 102 left the hall earlier. This scene 
showed to us how the minority expressed their silence.12  
The whole story echoes the theory: once field opinion swings toward opposing a practice 
(“change Hung” in this case) the spiral of silence exerts less pressure on other insiders to 
                                                            
11  http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/10/17/448592/Hung-forced.htm 
12  http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/924666 
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abandon the practice. Hung’s resistance came mainly from her normative motives but it is an 
importance source of her ignorance of a new majority-minority balance within KMT.  
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3. Extra Insights Drawn from Observation 
In this paper we have presented KMT’s case and demonstrated how the minority voice 
became majority by empowering itself with both field and public opinion, consolidating its 
alliance, and making the other actors to conform with the new majority, or at least making the 
new minority silent. The development of the KMT’s story fits quite well with what the theory of 
spiral of deinstitutionalization predicts, but we like to add four more points that the theory has 
not detailed. 
First, it is not clear if the whole story of deinstitutionalization is built upon the fear of 
isolation. Hung’s alliance shrank primarily due to the pressure of both field and public opinion. It 
is possible that members of this alliance are still KMT members and feared that they become 
minority and labelled. However, data we collected did not allow us to see this part happen. What 
we could add here is that under the same roof the fear of being labelled or isolated can be 
stronger than fear being in the minority side of an issue.  
Second, strategic motives drive the use of both field and public opinion. KMT primary 
administrators seemed divided in the first and second stage in terms of opposing or protecting 
Hung. The minority in the first two stages are not silent and doing nothing. Instead, they silently 
empowered themselves by given public poll figures (proving that they are right: Hung is a weak 
and not capable candidate for KMT) and using such information as means to achieve their goals. 
Spiral of deinstitutionalization may not be just a one way down or up spiral process. Instead, it 
can be a battle with multiple battlegrounds, such as using field opinion to confront the other 
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group within KMT, while creating another battleground outside the field, such as using field 
opinion to influence public opinion and then employing the favorable public opinion as means of 
attack. Although we don’t have more data showing that the attacking side on the third stage 
created or generated favorable polls, we suspect that such actions fit the expectation of strategic 
motives and were likely to have occurred. The attacking side’s news media alliance outside 
KMT is important helpers to create such favorable atmosphere. Not to say that DPP is also likely 
to adopt similar means to redistribute the public’s attention to the chaos of KMT or to keep 
KMT’s attention on this “changing Hung” issue. 
Third, in theory identification with a field could moderate the views of those in the minority 
to resist conversion. In this case, we have seen that she interpreted Hung’s strong identification 
with KMT as the primary motive to “keep fighting” (i.e., not resigning from the candidacy as a 
means to save and unite KMT). However, in the third stage, we also see that the majority group 
took advantage of such identification with KMT as an excuse to reject Hung.  The strategic 
move of calling extempore congress called for other alliance’s identification with the field to 
conquer the loyal minority.  
Fourth, resource arrangement can be a critical cause of division within the field. We see that 
the fights between groups within KMT are likely to originate in quarrels between stakeholders. If 
Hung and her office have sufficient resources and did not need to completely rely on the 
financial, personnel and organizational assistance from the party, her team would not have been 
surpassed by the minority so quickly.  
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Six people are critical in this dynamics as we like to recap below: Because Hung’s office 
director Joe Chen-Chung was strong in his attitudes of protecting Hung, initiated a series of 
quarrel with the director of Organizational Development Committee Su Jun-pin, who later 
detained Hung’s office and started to make alliance with Secretary-General Lee Shu-chuan. This 
further influenced the director of Administration Committee Lin Yu-hsien, and finally chairman 
Eric Chu. Here we present how power politics functions. This is a critical part not covered by the 
theory of deinstitutionalization and should not be understood simply by democratic rules. 
From this perspective, we see that the quarrels and debates about poll results are excuses or 
covers of purposes. In the theory field and public opinion are static and neutral but in the realm 
of politics they are effective means or tools by which to achieve the goals, particularly effective 
to a political party like KMT that has been sensitive to poll figures. 
 
Conclusion 
As political scientists start applying the complex-system approach to study party politics and 
as business scholars start to apply communication theories to study deinstitutionalization, we 
prospect a new possibility to study and explain politics within a political party. This study 
employs a systematically collected field observation data to evaluate Clemente and Roulet’s 
(2015) “the spiral of deinstitutionalization” framework. Based on analysis of news events and 
internal reports within Kuomintang from April 20 to October 17, 2015, we restore the whole 
story and provide details that contribute to enriching the framework for future organizational and 
political party studies. 
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Basically, the story evolves alone the expectation of the theory: minority in KMT that was 
suppressed by field opinion and public opinion in the beginning expanded its alliance to 
influence field opinion and then use both field and public opinion to rescind Hung Hsiu-Chu’s 
candidacy. Drowning from our field observation data, we add our points to the framework: First, 
fear of being in the minority in the theory should be better understood as fear of being labeled or 
isolated from those in power. Second, actors in the field can create, use, and manipulate both 
field and public opinion for their strategic motives. Third, identification with the field is not 
always a factor of resistance but can be a factor of coercion, conformity, or exclusion. Fourth, 
power relationship among key actors within an institution is fundamental to understand the 
development of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. The origin of a spiral dynamics of 
deinstitutionalization came from competition for resource arrangement.  
This study presents a near-perfect case for evaluating the theory of spiral of 
deinstitutionalization and enriches it with field observation. However, there are some limits 
prohibits us from providing deeper details for this study. First, we were not able to reach out for 
the key actors and check the extent to which our interpretation and description fit their true 
motives. Years later we may be allowed do so by conducting a series of interviews with them, 
but it won’t be proper during the campaign. Second, we have not collected evidence, if it is 
possible to collect, about how key actors create and maneuver field opinion and how these fields 
opinion are connected or linked to public opinion. Future studies into this field are very 
welcomed, as these mechanisms go beyond the original theory and reach a broader field of 
human politics and the future of democracy. 
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Future studies may not need to adopt the same framework and continue to adopt the analogy 
of “spiral of silence”. Instead, we look forward to more studies that both create meaningful and 
useful analogy and at the same time take into account our four points. Clemente and Roulet’s 
work is a great beginning and a milestone for the cooperation between business scholars and 
political scientists. We expect that future works following down this path will not only render 
descriptive power for cases like the one of this paper, but will contribute to a human-politics 
framework that explain and predict phenomenon that are critical to both disciplines. 
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